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THE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL
REVIEW, AND THE PUBLIC:
LEADERSHIP VERSUS DIALOGUE*
Michael E. Solimine**
James L. Walker***
[T]he most interesting thing about the great flag-burning
debate of the late 1980s would be how quickly that debate
evaporated. ...
. . . I can't even remember what my own opinion was on the flag
issue, though I remember I had a strong one.
-P.J. O'Rourke!

In his article, Dialogue and Judicial Review,z Barry Friedman poses a trenchant challenge to some received wisdom of
American constitutional law. Much constitutional discourse is
predicated on the assumption that the United States Supreme
Court is a counter-majoritarian institution, and normative theories supporting the exercise of judicial review are seen, by some,
as having to accommodate that fact. Many writers make this accommodation by showing that the other branches of government
are not majoritarian.J Friedman takes a different tack. According to Friedman, the assumption of counter-majoritarianism is
wrong, for there are several indicia that the Court is a
majoritarian political institution and in particular that it does respond to, and in turn influences, public opinion.
Thus, as Friedman notes, the Court sometimes makes reference to legislative enactments among the various states when
*
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1. P.J. O'Rourke, Parliament of Whores: A Lone Humorist Attempts to Explain the
Entire U.S. Government 77 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991).
2. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993).
3. See Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and
the Process of Adjudication 28-30 (Yale U. Press, 1990).
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rendering a decision;4 "[p]ublic opinion polls establish that, contrary to common thought, judicial decisions often gamer substantial public support";s and polls show that the public, in general,
holds the Court in high regard.6 Moreover, the public can indirectly influence judicial decisions through the appointment process, since Presidents usually nominate Justices with compatible
ideologies.7 In short, "[t]he Court facilitates and shapes the constitutional debate''s since its decisions are generally consistent
with, and to some extent formative of, the public's views of the
issues which reach the Court.
Friedman's contribution to our understanding of constitutional law is important because it focuses on the supposed empirical underpinnings of the counter-majoritarian assumption.
Unfortunately, we think that Friedman's use and interpretation
of social science data is partially flawed. That data is more complex and nuanced than he indicates, and this fact calls into question the breadth of some of the conclusions he reaches.9
First, the polling data with respect to public support of particular decisions is, at best, equivocal. As Friedman himself
notes, with some cases, such as the flagbuming decisions of 1989
and 1990,10 solid majorities of the public seem to be opposed to
the results.u Many other decisions, in contrast, receive support
in the polls. But on the whole, the data does not tell us much.
The leading work is that of Thomas Marshall, who has associated
the results of 139 decisions in fully argued Court cases to nationwide polls on those cases. Of that number, about 55% were consistent with the will of the majority as revealed by the poll.t2 This
percentage is hardly awe-inspiring, and may, in fact, just as easily
4. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev at 597 (cited in note 2). The best example is the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
5. ld. at 607.
6. Id. at 624.
7. Id. at 675-76.
8. ld. at 654.
9. To be sure, Friedman frames his article as a response to the legal community,
and not to political scientists as such. ld. at 586 n.41. Nonetheless, his project is explicitly
a descriptive one, and he refers at several points to studies by political scientists, including
a number discussed in this paper. ld. at 624 n.235 (citing works by Marshall and Caldeira
and Gibson). Thus, we are evaluating him on his own terms.
10. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
11. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 605-06 (cited in note 2).
12. Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court 71-79 (Unwin Hyman, 1989) (data from 1935-1986) ("Supreme Court") (if "unclear" decisions are not included, agreement rises to 63% in the years 1935-86); Thomas R. Marshall, Public
Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, 74 Judicature 322 (1991) (data from 1986-1990) ("Rehnquist Court").
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be used to demonstrate a lack of public support for the Court's
decisions. There are also several other problems attendant to
such associations: only a tiny fraction of Court decisions have
been studied, and the polling questions themselves, of necessity,
often oversimplify the holding of a case.tJ Moreover, the vast
majority of Court decisions escape the scrutiny of public opinion
polls entirely.
It may be true that the polls tell us that the Court possesses
relatively high levels of public prestige and support, especially as
compared with other American institutions.l4 One recent study
found a high correlation over the past three decades between the
ideological mood of the public and all Court decisions, when the
latter are categorized as either liberal or conservative.ts But
here, too, the evidence is equivocal. The Court's public support
has declined during periods, such as the Warren era, when the
Court rendered controversial decisions, some of which engendered significant public opposition.t6 Likewise, the Court's public support is largely diffuse and, with the exception of opinion
leaders, seems largely divorced from the satisfaction of particular
policy preferences.17 One might say that the Court receives the
most public support just when it needs it the least.
Finally, we think that Friedman's metaphor of an interactive
dialogue between the Court and public is, at best, incomplete.
He envisions the Court as rendering decisions, which generate
reaction among attentive publics, such as Congress. Congress
might then make laws which, in turn, may be subject to legal
challenge and eventually reach the Court again. The Court may
thus be viewed as synthesizing and focusing the debate over important public issues, and as placing issues on the policy
agenda.ts
This normatively appealing vision, taken at its broadest, is
premised on several unrealistic assumptions. The public at large
is uninformed about the Court or its decisions, and indeed large
13. Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in John B. Gates and Charles
A. Johnson, eds., The American Courts: A Critical Assessment 303, 304-13 (Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1991).
14. Marshall, Rehnquist Court at 326 (cited in note 12).
15. William Mischler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993).
16. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1209 (1986).
17. Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for
the Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635, 658-59 (1992).
18. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 669-70 (cited in note 2).
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segments of the public possess incorrect knowledge about Court
decisions.t9 Much of the blame can probably be assigned to the
news media, whose reporting on court decisions is almost invariably dominated by sound bites.w But some of the blame might
also rest with members of the other branches of government who
distort the Court's decisions for political gain.
Friedman's principal examplezt of the Court as a facilitator
of debate, Roe v. Wade and its progeny, is not a compelling one.
Whatever else one thinks about the decision, the dialogue it set
off seems to have, to this day, largely polarized the public over
the entire abortion issue. That is, especially with regard to the
legality and public funding of discretionary abortions, the pro-life
and pro-choice factions appeared to have hardened their respective positions.zz The dialogue metaphor is also weakened by the
lack of any apparent direct causal mechanism between the Court
and the public. To be sure, there are indirect mechanisms identified by Friedman, such as the appointment of Justices by likeminded Presidents. Similarly, any judge is a product of her environment, and surely social and political mores, which change
over time, are reflected in the Justice's decisions in cases.
But having said that, there is little or no explicit recognition
in the Court's decisions that public opinion, or previous or anticipated public reaction, is a driving force. In some areas, substantive doctrines are informed by indicia of public sentiment.23 But
19. Marshall, Supreme Coun at 142-46 (cited in note 12). Compare Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Coun an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961, 1007-10
(1992) (arguing that at least some of public is competent enough to engage in dialogue
with the Court); Charles H. Franklin, Liane C. Kosaki and Herbert M. Kritzer, The Salience of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 25 (delivered at annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2-5, 1993) (on file with authors)
(new polling data shows that "[t]he picture of the public as minimally aware and generally
ignorant of the Court's actions is ... simply wrong.").
20. Elliot E. Slotnick, Media coverage of Supreme Court decision making: problems
and prospects, 75 Judicature 128 (1991). Elliot E. Slotnick and Jennifer A. Segal, Television News and the Supreme Coun (delivered at annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 3-6, 1992) (on file with authors).
21. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 647-48, 658-68 (cited in note 2).
22. Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 751 (1989). For
similar conclusions drawn about the abortion debate, see Ruth Colker, Abonion & Dialogue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and American Law 114-25 (Ind. U. Press, 1992); Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 164-68 (The Free Press,
1991); Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 175-77 (Oxford
U. Press, 1988). It was precisely her view that Roe v. Wade may have had this effect that
has raised questions about Ruth Bader Ginsburg's commitment to abortion rights. See
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381-86 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1199-1209 (1992).
23. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 597 (cited in note 2).
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the vast majority of opinions make no allusion to this factor.z4
Indeed, the Court will often take pains to point out that the law
demands a result, irrespective of popular win.zs And, as in a
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,z6
sometimes the Court seems to be explicitly leading, rather than
following, the public.27 It is difficult to demonstrate, in any sort
of systematic way, that public opinion influences Court decisionmaking.zs
Despite our reservations, we agree with Friedman's broad
conclusions. But we think the overall data about public opinion
leads to a restatement of the problem. Majoritarianism is not a
dichotomous variable, but is instead continuous. It is dangerous
for any branch, elected or not, to be too majoritarian. In our
political culture, references are often made to the "tyranny of the
majority."z9 Over time, over generations,3o the Court is as
majoritarian as any other branch of government is, or ought to
be. One of the functions of leadership is to create new majorities, and the Court has a leadership role as important as that of
any other branch of government, as measured by public support
and acceptance (or acquiescence) in its decisions.
Shifting majorities of the public do disagree with many decisions, to the extent they perceive them, or are simply ignorant of
24. See Marshall, Supreme Court at 31-55 (cited in note 12); Marshall, Rehnquist
Coun at 327-28 (cited in note 12).
25. Examples are legion. One relevant one is United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 318 (1990) ("any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech
becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First
Amendment.").
26. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
27. ld. at 2816 (Opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (Court will "speak
before all others for [the American people's] constitutional ideals."). Cf. id. at 2882
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this
language as a "Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a
Yolk .... ").
28. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 240 (Cambridge U. Press, 1993).
29. The term tyranny of the majority is often associated with the 19th century de
Tocqueville, but it actually dates as far back, at least, as the debates over ratification of
the Constitution. ("A bill of rights ... serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority.... [E]xperience ... has proved the prevalence of a
disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual
against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy.") Winthrop, the
Letters of Agrippa, XVIII (1788), in Essays on The Constitution of the United States 115,
117 (P. Forded. 1892 & photo. reprint 1970), quoted in Introduction, in The Antifederalists xciii (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
30. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Bills of Rights and Regression to the Mean, 15 Harv.
J. Law & Pub. Pol'y 71, 72-73 (1992).
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the great mass of the Court's jurisprudence.3t But this is also
true of many decisions of the House of Representatives, arguably
(at least by design) the most majoritarian of the branches. As
just one example, it has been widely reported that a high percentage of the public favors some sort of federal law controlling
handguns. Such legislation never gets out of committee.3z
Recent developments, such as the continued salience of the
abortion issue, and the nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas,33 may well raise public consciousness of the activities of the Court as many interest groups appear to seek to
capture it for their own purposes. Ironically, while we think the
data available is inconclusive, it might well be that the public in
the future will demand an even more majoritarian Court, perhaps to our deep regret.34

31. As Friedman points out, some of his discussion is akin to a dialogic vision of the
Court's statutory interpretation jurisprudence and the response of Congress. Friedman,
91 Mich. L. Rev. at 581 n.16 (cited in note 2). In that regard, it is worth noting that many
congressional overrulings of statutory cases are driven by interest groups. Michael E.
Solimine and James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 425, 449 (1992).
32. See Felicity Barringer, Majority in Poll Back Ban on Handguns, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 1993, at A14. See generally Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of
Public Opinion on Policy, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 175 (1983).
33. See L. Marvin Overby, et al., Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate
Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 997 (1992); Kathleen Frankovic and Joyce Gelb, Public Opinion and the Thomas Nomination, 25 PS 481
(1992).
34. Cf. Caldeira & Gibson, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 659 (cited in note 17) ("To the
extent that the Court becomes politicized or perceived as such, it risks cutting itself off
from its natural reservoir of goodwill and may become reliant for basic institutional support on those who profit from its policies").

